In my opinion, I think the Supreme Court would not overturn an amended version of the federal statute at issue in the United States v. Morrison case. Based on a personal opinion, an amended version of the federal statute at issue in the U.S. v. Morrison case means that the federal statute would provide a clause in the Commerce clause that would stipulate that the United States Congress should have the power to regulate all matters that affect intrastate and interstate commercial activities, whether directly or indirectly. This would also include those matters that have a potential of affecting commercial activities both locally and nationally. In addition, an amended version of the federal statute at issue in the United States v. Morrison would invalidate the famous United States v. Lopez ruling that caused limitation of congressional power concerning implementation of the Commerce clause (Kanovitz, 2010). Generally, an amended version of the federal statute at the United States v. Morrison issue would result into increment of congressional powers to regulate all matters that have a potential of limiting trade. Based on this argument, the Supreme Court would not have a basis of overturning an amended version of the federal statute since it would be acting ultra vires.
Besides, an amended version of the federal statute concerning the matter related to the United States v. Morrisonwould increase the scope of the Commerce clause in matters related to civil rights and sex offenders. Currently, the only part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is recognized in the Commerce clause, is non-discrimination of black customers by business people (Kanovitz, 2010). The Civil Rights Act provides that all individuals, not only have a right to be free from any form of discrimination, but also have a right to be free from any form of violence. Therefore, in my opinion, an amended version of the federal statute in matter related to U.S. v. Morrison would encompass inclusion of all matters stipulated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the scope of the Commerce clause.
Moreover, the Commerce clause recognizes the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, which stipulates that all sex offenders should undergo registration when moving from one state to another (Kanovitz, 2010). Inclusion of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act in the Commerce clause is clear evidence that the law recognizes that presence of sex offenders disrupts commercial activities in any given state. Based on this reasoning, it fair if the scope of the Commerce clause is expanded to include the provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. Therefore, if the Congress would have the power to decide on matters related to sex offenses under the Commerce clause, then the Supreme Court would be at no position to overturn the decision of the Congress.